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ABSTRACT
Membership rates of alternative unions that offer individual juridical guidance and assistance 
but rarely contribute to collective bargaining are increasing in Denmark. Conversely, the overall 
membership rates of traditional unions that negotiate collective agreements are decreasing.  This 
means that local shop stewards often face a mixed environment of workers in traditional unions 
and workers in alternative unions at the individual workplace. Surveys have indicated that shop 
stewards split into two groups when dealing with non-members at the workplace. Half of them 
choose to represent non-members (pull strategy), whereas the other half choose not to (push 
strategy).  This article presents an explorative case study of the recruitment and retention strate-
gies used by two shop stewards in two different companies with significant groups of alternatively 
organized workers.  A case with sector-level wage setting and a case with local-level wage setting 
within the manufacturing sector are compared. Results suggest that shop stewards in both types 
of settings tend to combine push and pull strategies, because they serve different purposes. Push 
strategies help retain existing members of the traditional unions, whereas pull strategies are neces-
sary to recruit new members.  Local-level wage setting seems to offer more opportunities for shop 
stewards to make use of push and pull strategies than sector-level wage setting.  Local negotiators 
can be efficient organizers, because they are able to demonstrate visible advantages of union 
membership on a regular and individual basis. However, it is also a high-risk project that among 
others depends on the support from the local union office. 
KEY WORDS
Alternative unions / Traditional unions / Danish Industrial Relations / Organizing / Shop stewards /  
Wage setting level
Introduction and background 
Although Danish union densities remain comparatively high, a declining tendency has been observed during the last 15 years (Due et al. 2010; Visser 2006). This development both reflects a rise in the number of workers with no union affiliation 
at all and a rise in the number of workers organized in alternative unions. In the Dan-
ish context, alternative unions refer to unions that offer individual juridical guidance 
and assistance but rarely contribute to collective bargaining. This means that they are 
significantly cheaper to join than traditional unions, who invest the majority of their 
1 E-mail: ai@faos.dk 
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resources in collective bargaining activities. Surveys have demonstrated that the cheaper 
membership fee is one of the most important reasons why workers make the shift from 
traditional to alternative unions. Another important reason is dissatisfaction with the 
individual service delivered by the traditional union (Ibsen et al. 2012). Furthermore, 
the alternative unions seem to attract a lot of young workers, which is a group that 
traditional unions in Denmark as well as in other countries find it difficult to recruit and 
retain (Ibsen et al. 2011, 2012; Tailby and Pollert 2011; Visser 2002).
The development in union densities is also evident at the local level. Today, shop 
stewards who represent the traditional unions increasingly face a complex environ-
ment of traditionally organized workers, alternatively organized workers, and un-
organized workers on the shop floor. Whereas one in three local shop stewards had 
unorganized or alternatively organized colleagues in 1998, this was the case for two 
in three shop stewards in 2010 (Navrbjerg and Larsen 2011). Danish as well as inter-
national studies have demonstrated how local employee representatives play an im-
portant role in the retention and recruitment of union members (Larsen et al. 2010; 
Oesch 2012; Pilemalm et al. 2001). Several unions in Denmark and other Western 
countries have launched initiatives to strengthen this role, for instance, through orga-
nizer campaigns (Arnholtz et al. 2012; Badigannavar and Kelly 2005, 2011; Hickey 
et al. 2010). An increasing number of unorganized and alternatively organized work-
ers therefore mean that shop stewards must focus more of their work on recruiting 
and retaining union members. 
However, it might be difficult for shop stewards to combine certain recruitment and 
retention initiatives with their other tasks at the workplace. Danish shop stewards are 
elected among members of the traditional unions at the workplace, and they are only 
obliged to represent those members. Yet, surveys have indicated that shop stewards split 
into two groups when it comes to non-members. Approximately half of the shop stew-
ards (48%) choose to represent non-members in the same way as members, whereas the 
other half (39%) choose not to (Larsen et al. 2010: 99; Navrbjerg and Larsen 2011: 91). 
How can we explain this answer? A possible explanation might be that many Danish 
shop stewards are involved in extensive bargaining activities at the company level. A large 
part of the private sector in Denmark is characterized by local-level wage setting (within 
the framework of sector-level agreements). Hence, the majority of shop stewards in the 
private sector need to establish a strong bargaining mandate toward management, which 
can affect their choice of recruitment and retention strategies. 
Previous studies have shown that it is often more difficult for shop stewards and 
other forms of employee and/or union representatives to coordinate bargaining ob-
jectives among the workers than it is for management representatives to coordinate 
bargaining objectives among the other managers (Ilsøe 2012; Walton and McKersie 
1965). The presence of alternatively organized or unorganized workers might make 
this process of intra-organizational bargaining even more challenging for local shop 
stewards. If shop stewards depend on a strong bargaining mandate, they may prefer 
inclusive strategies toward non-members to avoid conflicts among workers. On the 
contrary, if shop stewards depend less on a strong bargaining mandate, they may feel 
more free to make use of exclusive strategies toward non-members. The split answer 
by Danish shop stewards regarding the representation of non-members might there-
fore be explained by the difference in bargaining activity at the local level, i.e., the 
wage setting level. 
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The aim of this article is to investigate and compare the use of recruitment and 
retention strategies among local shop stewards in Denmark who face alternatively orga-
nized workers at their workplace but operate under different wage setting levels. It asks 
the questions why shop stewards choose to represent (or not to represent) alternatively 
organized workers, what this representation includes, and which consequences their 
choice has for the retention and recruitment of members of the traditional unions. The 
background analysis presented in the first sections is based on desk research and second-
ary literature and data. The main part of the analysis is based on explorative case stud-
ies at two different manufacturing companies with significant groups of alternatively 
organized workers. Each case study includes document studies on the company and an 
in-depth interview with the shop steward representing the largest group of workers in 
production. A company with local-level wage setting and a company with sector-level 
wage setting are included in the case study. 
Union density decline and the growth of alternative  
unions in Denmark 
During the last decades, Denmark has been characterized as a best case of organized 
labor markets (Ilsøe et al. 2007; Traxler 1995). In the 1980s and the 1990s the Danish 
labor market did not experience significant drops in union densities and in the coverage 
of collective agreements like many other countries in the Western world. However, after 
the millennium union densities started to decline also in the Danish case. The overall 
union density of 73% in 2000 had decreased to 67% in 2012 (Due et al. 2012). Manu-
facturing workers, who are the focus of this article, have typically had one of the better 
union densities in the private sector in Denmark, but they also experienced a significant 
decline after the millennium (Due et al. 2010: 100). 
The overall union density, however, does not tell us the full story about the trends 
of disorganization on the Danish labor market. In recent years a new type of union has 
gained foothold on the Danish labor market, which is included in the general figures on 
union densities. These are the so-called alternative unions, which offer individual juridi-
cal guidance and assistance but rarely negotiate collective agreements. They are cheaper 
to join than the traditional unions, as they do not contribute to collective bargaining and 
other activities of the collective bargaining system. Such absence of collective bargaining 
activities is also characteristic of different forms of “alternative workers organizations” 
or “quasi-unions” found in other countries (Heckscher and Carre 2006; Hyde 2006). It 
is, however, important to underline that alternative unions in Denmark recruit members 
in all types of jobs and sectors. Here, they differ from the so-called “company unions,” 
which are limited to and run by a specific company. 
In 2002 a new law on cross-industry unemployment funds created new opportuni-
ties for most alternative unions to establish their own unemployment insurance fund 
and copy this practice from the traditional unions in Denmark (Lind 2009).1 The result 
was that more alternative unions were able to benefit from the so-called Ghent effect, 
i.e., when unions administer unemployment insurance, this usually contributes posi-
tively to the membership rates of the unions (Due et al. 2010; Visser 2002). Furthermore, 
in 2006, a verdict from The European Court of Human Rights considered closed shop 
agreements illegal on the Danish labor market (Justesen 2009). This made it possible 
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for alternative unions in Denmark to recruit members at more workplaces than before. 
Today, alternative unions are a serious competition to the traditional unions, as they 
represent more than 12% of all union members (or 8% of all employees) in Denmark 
(Due et al. 2012). The development in membership rates for the traditional unions and 
the alternative unions is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Percentage of employees on the Danish labor market who are members of traditional 
unions, alternative unions, or without union affiliation 1995–2012. 
Source: Graph created using figures from Due et al. (2012).
The largest alternative unions in Denmark are The Christian Union (Krifa) and The 
Union House (Det Faglige Hus). The Christian Union, which has the longest history 
among alternative unions in Denmark, has about 135,000 ordinary members, whereas 
The Union House has about 80,000.2 The Christian Union developed as a protest to 
the social-democratic orientation of the traditional unions, whereas The Union House 
started out as a union for white collar workers but later incorporated self-employed and 
blue collar workers. Both unions administer their own unemployment insurance fund 
and have expanded their membership rates significantly in the last decade. 
Surveys have shown that the price difference in union membership is the most im-
portant reason why members choose to leave one of the traditional unions for an al-
ternative union. Whereas the monthly membership fees of traditional and alternative 
unemployment insurance funds are very similar (about 60–65 €), the monthly member-
ship fees of the alternative unions are less than half the fees of the traditional unions 
(10–20 € vs. 45–75 €). Interestingly, the second most important reason to make the 
shift to an alternative union is dissatisfaction with the individual service delivered by 
the traditional union (Ibsen et al. 2012). This is in spite of the fact that traditional and 
alternative unions in principle differ more on the collective services than the individual 
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services. Whereas both types of unions offer individual services like juridical guidance 
and assistance, discounts on various goods, invitations to meetings and courses, and ac-
cess to supplementary unemployment insurance (that adds on top of the unemployment 
insurance system), it is only the traditional unions that contribute to the financing and 
organization of the collective services. The latter include negotiations of collective agree-
ments, resolutions of collective conflicts, social dialogue, and representation of members 
at the workplace level by local shop stewards (see Table 1 for a comparison of union 
activities in traditional and alternative unions in Denmark).
Table 1 Union activities—a comparison of traditional and alternative unions in Denmark
Traditional  
unions
Alternative  
unions
Union activities  
(collective)
Union activities  
(individual)
-  Collective bargaining at the sector level (and 
local level) 
-  Support of industrial conflicts
Yes No*
-  Social dialogue between unions, employers’ 
organizations, and the state
- Negotiation of tripartite agreements
Yes No
-  Election of union representatives at the 
workplace level (shop stewards) that represent 
members in local negotiations and cooperation
Yes No
- Juridical guidance and assistance Yes Yes
- Discounts on insurance, holidays, and shopping Yes Yes
- Invitations to courses and meetings Yes Yes
-  Supplementary unemployment insurance 
(supplementary fee)
Yes Yes
Activities of  
unemployment  
insurance fund
- Unemployment benefits 
-  Individual guidance on job seeking and further 
training
Yes Yes
Source: Author’s own research on union activities at the web pages of the following traditional and alternative unions: 
The Danish Metalworkers’ Union (Dansk Metal), The United Federation of Danish Workers (3F), The Danish Food and 
Allied Workers’ Union (NNF), The Christian Union (Krifa), and The Union House (Det Faglige Hus).
*One of the alternative unions in Denmark, The Christian Union, to a limited extent negotiates company-level agreements. 
However, these agreements only cover a small group of their members.
However, there might be good reasons why employees mainly compare the quality of the 
individual service – and not the collective service. The employers’ organizations on the 
Danish labor market have argued for years that all workers should be treated equally 
no matter their organizational status, as this is administratively easier and cheaper for 
the individual employer (Due and Madsen 2007). This point of view is reflected in the 
Danish labor market regulation. If a collective agreement is present at the workplace, 
it is a general rule in the Danish collective bargaining system that non-members are 
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covered in the same way as members of the traditional unions (Due et al. 1994, 2010; 
Ibsen et al. 2011, 2012). This means that the individual worker can join an alternative 
union, which is cheaper, and still be covered by the collective agreement negotiated by 
the traditional union. It can be argued that such a choice contains an element of free rid-
ing, as the worker will have access to all the gains of the agreement without contributing 
to the collective bargaining system (Olson 1965). However, the collective agreement 
coverage also means that it is possible for the individual worker to compare the quality 
of the individual service delivered by the traditional and the alternative union, respec-
tively. Workers are free to choose the union with the best individual service without los-
ing collective agreement coverage. The competition between traditional and alternative 
unions is therefore strong on the individual service.
Nevertheless, coverage by collective agreements is not the same as representation by 
local shop stewards. The alternative unions rarely elect local employee representatives, 
and only members of the traditional unions are entitled to representation and support by 
their local shop steward in case of any individual disagreements with management. This 
puts the assistance and support delivered by local shop stewards at the very center of 
attention regarding recruitment and retention of members to the traditional unions. Lo-
cal shop stewards can demonstrate the difference between membership of a traditional 
and an alternative union in a detectable way for the individual worker who is in need 
of shop steward support. This is a good argument for traditional unions to assign local 
shop stewards a key role in the organizing task. As we shall see, there are, however, also 
counterarguments to this. Danish shop stewards to varying degrees perform collective 
bargaining at the workplace, and the combination of being an “organizer” and a “nego-
tiator” contains potential role conflicts.
Decentralization of collective bargaining and role conflicts among 
shop stewards: does this affect recruitment and retention strategies?
In many countries the story of declining or dropping union densities has been related to 
a process of decentralization of collective bargaining (Traxler 1995). This relation is not 
so clear in the Danish case. First of all due to the fact that most employees on the labor 
market remain covered by sector-level agreements, there is full coverage in the public 
sector and about 70% coverage in the private sector (Due et al. 2010: 81). Second, the 
Danish collective bargaining system always has been characterized by both trends of 
centralization and trends of decentralization (Due et al. 1994; Ilsøe et al. 2007). The 
famous September Compromise in 1899 between industry and labor initiated a process, 
which in the first half of the 20th century led to an institutionalization of negotiations 
and industrial conflicts at central levels. However, the development was not at the cost 
of the possibilities for local-level wage setting. Pay has been a matter of company-level 
bargaining in the metal industry since the beginning of the 20th century, and today many 
sector-level agreements in the private sector include a large room for maneuver for local-
level negotiations on pay. 
However, we find various levels of decentralization within the Danish collective 
bargaining system and within manufacturing, which is the focus of this article. Wag-
es are mainly negotiated at the sector level in the public sector, whereas the private 
sector represents a mixture of sector-level and local-level wage setting. The Industrial 
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Agreement,3 which covers blue collar workers in the metal industry and some other 
industries, only regulate a relatively low minimum wage on top of which local manag-
ers and shop stewards negotiate further wage increases. In comparison, The Collective 
Agreement for the Food Industry,4 which covers workers in a large part of the food 
industry, stipulates a much higher normal wage, which in most cases is paid to the 
workers without supplementary negotiations at the local level. These two types of wage 
setting result in somewhat different working conditions for local managers and shop 
stewards within manufacturing. 
In companies with local-level wage setting, shop stewards typically renegotiate 
company-level agreements on pay (and other issues) each year, whereas shop stewards in 
workplaces without local-level wage setting participate in few negotiations. One might 
therefore expect the presence of alternative organized workers to be more challenging 
for shop stewards covered by minimum wage agreements, because they more often need 
to establish a strong bargaining mandate. Thorough case studies at the company level 
have shown how shop stewards often experience role conflicts between their relations 
with management and their relations with the worker collective. Often they find it dif-
ficult to create compromises that meet the needs and wishes of both sides of the indus-
try, i.e., what Walton and McKersie have characterized as boundary conflicts (Due and 
Madsen 1972; Lysgaard 1961; Navrbjerg 1999; Walton and McKersie 1965). However, 
when shop stewards are faced with a worker collective of mixed organizational status, 
this can also lead to important role conflicts in relation to their constituencies. On the 
one hand, shop stewards must engage all workers in order to secure peace and agree-
ment among workers and create a strong bargaining mandate toward management. On 
the other hand, they are not obliged to (and might choose not to) represent alternatively 
organized workers during negotiations (Due et al. 1994, 2010). Although agreements 
will cover all workers at the workplace, shop stewards are allowed to negotiate agree-
ments that mainly address the needs and wishes of members of the traditional union. 
Accordingly, shop stewards can be faced with the challenge of engaging all workers 
for support of their bargaining mandate and at the same time differentiate their repre-
sentation of members and non-members. This scenario includes potential role conflicts 
between workers’ expectations to the shop stewards and the services offered by the shop 
steward (Due and Madsen 1972). Such role conflicts can be characterized as internal 
conflicts on the employee side (Walton and McKersie 1965). In sum, shop stewards in 
companies with workers of mixed organizational status potentially are faced with at 
least two different role conflicts, which might complicate the use of recruitment and 
retention strategies (see Figure 2):
The question is how these potential role conflicts affect the choice of recruitment 
and retention strategies among shop stewards. Declining union densities have forced tra-
ditional unions in many countries to focus more on how to recruit and retain members, 
but it remains an open question how recruitment and retention strategies interact with 
negotiations at the local level. At least two different approaches to potential members 
have been observed among American and European unions. Many unions have used a 
“service model,” which refers to a strategy of exclusive services at one or more levels of 
the union. The main idea is to reserve special rights or services to union members in or-
der to make it attractive for non-members to join—and for members to stay (Heery et al. 
2000; Turberville 2004). This approach seeks to fight free riding among workers by 
assigning members concrete benefits of union membership (Olson 1965). However, the 
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service model has been criticized for its rather passive approach toward unorganized 
workers and workers in new areas of the economy (Gall 2005). In recent years, many 
traditional unions have introduced the so-called “organizer model” as an alternative 
strategy (Hickey et al. 2010). This strategy focuses on the mobilization and empowering 
of especially unorganized workers to pursue their own interests with union support. The 
idea is to motivate unorganized workers to join the union by including them in union 
or union-like activities. If they see what difference it can make in practice to articulate 
their needs, they should be more likely to sign up. Experiences with the organizer model 
seem to be mixed—some report about positive effects on recruitment, whereas oth-
ers conclude that effects are limited (Badigannavar and Kelly 2005, 2011; Gall 2005; 
Hickey et al. 2010). 
The service and the organizer model differ quite distinctively on a number of as-
pects. The first is more reactive and the second more proactive. The service model was 
very popular in the early phase of union decline, whereas the organizer model is an in-
creasingly popular approach today. However, the most striking difference between them 
is their attitude toward non-members. Whereas the organizer model builds on a clear 
pull strategy (the inclusion of non-members), the service model mainly focuses on push 
strategies (the exclusion of non-members). 
At first glance, it seems possible to argue for both push and pull strategies among 
shop stewards at the workplace level. As our overview of union services illustrates (see 
Table 1), free riding might not be the rational choice for workers in companies with shop 
Figure 2: Potential role conflicts for shop stewards at workplaces with workers in both traditional 
and alternative unions.
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stewards’ presence, because only union members are entitled to assistance from their 
local shop steward. This difference makes it possible for shop stewards to exclude non-
members from their services—in order to retain current members and recruit new ones. 
However, some shop stewards might also see an active representation of non-members 
as a way to recruit new members, because it allows them to demonstrate the concrete 
advantages of paying the membership fee. The inclusion of non-members could take the 
form of listening to non-members’ needs and wishes during local negotiations, answer-
ing questions in relation to collective agreements, or individual representation in certain 
cases of a disagreement with management. 
However, as we have seen, the choice of strategy may not be straightforward. Some 
shop stewards in Denmark frequently negotiate collective agreements at the workplace, 
and they may be more concerned about how recruitment and retention strategies affect 
the solidarity among workers. Push strategies can leave alternatively organized workers 
dissatisfied and give rise to internal conflicts among workers. Pull strategies might there-
fore be a more obvious choice for shop stewards who often negotiate at the workplace. 
This leads us to the following research questions:
1.  When do shop stewards choose to represent (or not to represent) alternatively organized 
workers? What does this representation include and what consequences do their choice 
of strategy have for the retention and recruitment of traditional union members?
2.  Do we observe any difference in the choice of strategy and effects between cases of 
local-level and sector-level wage setting?
In the case analyses, we will use the concepts of push and pull strategies to identify situa-
tions, where the local shop stewards choose to represent or not to represent members of 
the alternative unions. Furthermore, we will use the concepts to identify different types 
of push and pull strategies and their effects. 
Methods
The first part of the analysis presented in the background sections rests on desk research 
and studies of secondary literature and data. The remaining part of the analysis is based 
on explorative case studies of how two local shop stewards deal with the presence of 
alternatively organized workers in two different companies. 
The case study design with a focus on a limited number of in-depth studies was chosen 
to reflect the open character of the research questions. Case studies were performed within 
manufacturing, which is one of the sectors heavily affected by the rise in alternatively or-
ganized workers (Ibsen et al. 2011: 115). As mentioned earlier, Danish manufacturing is 
characterized by two types of wage setting. This means that shop stewards are faced with 
different demands of collective bargaining at the company level, and perhaps different 
choices with regard to their strategies toward alternatively organized workers. Accord-
ingly, a case of local-level wage setting (metal industry) and a case of sector-level wage 
setting (food industry) were included to compare shop stewards’ strategies. Both case com-
panies were covered by collective agreements, had shop stewards present, and contained 
significant groups of organized and alternatively organized workers (see Table 2 for the 
main characteristics of the two companies). 
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Table 2 Overview of main characteristics of the case companies.
Production 
workers  
(number)
Covered by  
collective  
agreements
Workers in  
traditional 
unions  
(percentage)
Workers in  
alternative 
unions  
(percentage)
Unorganized 
workers  
(percentage)
Wage setting
(most  
important 
level)
Case A 250 Yes 50% 50% 0% Sector level
Case B 150 Yes 80% 15% 5% Local level
Each case study included document studies of all relevant local agreements, surveys, and 
reports at the company as well as an in-depth interview with the local shop steward 
representing the largest group of production workers on-site. Interview guides were pre-
pared on the basis of a secondary analysis of available literature and data and included 
questions on union membership among the production workers, the development in 
union membership over the last decade, shop steward representation of workers in tra-
ditional unions and of workers in alternative unions, local negotiation and cooperation 
with management, recruitment and retention of union members, and challenges when 
dealing with workers in alternative unions. All interviews were transcribed in full before 
the final analysis, and all citations were translated from Danish to English by the author. 
The initial strategy of analysis was thematic. First, we performed an open coding of the 
interviews identifying different push and pull strategies in relation to alternatively orga-
nized workers. Second, we went through the interviews again with a more focused coding 
and located where the different strategies had been used, what the effects were, and which 
opportunities and challenges there had been in the take-up of each strategy. 
Analysis
The analysis of each case is structured in a short case introduction followed by an analy-
sis of the interview with the shop steward. After the two case analyses, results are sum-
marized and compared. 
Case A
Company A is a Danish food company with approximately 250 production workers. All 
workers are covered by The Collective Agreement for the Food Industry. After the ver-
dict on closed shop agreements in 2006, the first workers left the traditional union and 
joined an alternative union. Today, approximately half of the workers are in the alterna-
tive unions—especially The Christian Union and The Union House—and half of them 
are in the traditional unions. All types of workers have joined the alternative unions—
young, old, men, women, workers with high seniority, and workers with low seniority. 
The shop steward representing the production workers has been with the company for 
many years and is a member of the local works council and of the company manage-
ment board. At present, no local agreements have been concluded between management 
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and the shop steward, which reflects that wage setting at the sector level plays the most 
important role in the food industry. The company has recently been through a number 
of firing rounds due to increasing competition on the world market. This is also one of 
the reasons why the company mainly hires workers on temporary contracts.
Strategies toward alternatively organized workers
The shop steward in company A makes use of both push and pull strategies toward 
alternatively organized workers. The shop steward highlights pull strategies as more ef-
fective recruitment tools than push strategies. Furthermore, push strategies seem more 
difficult to implement in practice. A closer analysis of the different push and pull strate-
gies used by the shop steward is presented below. 
Push strategies: different service levels 
Shop steward A uses a number of push strategies toward alternatively organized work-
ers to motivate them to join the traditional union. The idea is to clarify the difference 
in services that workers are entitled to receive. One strategy is only to assist members 
of the traditional union, when the company lays off workers, and to leave alternatively 
organized workers on their own:
‘Last time we were firing people, only six of the fired workers were members of our union. I 
accompanied them to all meetings and I checked out that everything followed the rules. (…) 
I did not do anything for the other workers. That was the clear message.’ [Shop steward A]
A second push strategy is to refuse to answer difficult questions, when they are raised by 
non-members. The shop steward does not mind answering simple questions, but ques-
tions that need further investigation are rejected: 
‘If a worker asks a question I do not know the answer to, I will call the union and ask 
for help, if the worker is in our union. If the worker is member of one of the alternative 
unions, I will say: “You have to call your union and ask about that”.’ [Shop steward A]
Thirdly, the shop steward arranges debate sessions for members only. The workers are 
very interested in them, and it is therefore a clear disadvantage to non-members:
‘Tomorrow we are going to have a debate session about early retirement benefits, and 
somebody will give an introductory lecture. This event is for members only. (…) We must 
do things like this more often.’ [Shop steward A]
However, it is not always easy for the shop steward to implement these push strategies 
in practice. Some of the workers have been at the workplace for a long time—and so 
has the shop steward. It is according to the shop steward’s experience difficult to use the 
push strategies mentioned above when it comes to those workers who have a high senior-
ity at the workplace and only recently made the shift from the traditional union to an 
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alternative union. Which services are they entitled to? Are they entitled to a better service 
than newly hired alternatively organized workers? Some of these workers have been the 
shop steward’s colleagues back to the days of piece work, where it was important with 
a strong solidarity at the assembly line. If one of them had a bad day, the others would 
work harder to make everybody meet the demands. This creates a role conflict between 
representing the workplace (workplace solidarity) and representing the union (union 
solidarity), which makes the take-up of push strategies difficult at the company level:
‘It is difficult. It is very difficult. I know, I should offer the same service to a new colleague as 
to a colleague, I have been working with for 20 years. But it is obvious that I feel different  
for an old colleague.’ [Shop steward A]
Pull strategies: inform and convince through dialogue 
The shop steward does, however, not only use push strategies in relation to alternatively 
organized workers. Pull strategies are also on the repertoire. One of the pull strategies is 
to ask newly hired workers whether they are member of the traditional union, and ex-
plain the advantages of such membership. However, the shop steward uses this strategy 
in a reflexive way. Many new workers are on temporary contracts, and the shop steward 
understands if they want to wait and see until they get an open-ended contract: 
‘When I speak with new workers, I ask them if they are in a union, and most of them are. 
Then I tell them that we prefer that they join our union, because it strengthens our bar-
gaining power at the workplace. Some of them have been with the alternative unions for 
a long time. If they only are hired for a shorter period of time, I often tell them: “We will 
get back to it, if you get a permanent position”.’ [Shop steward A]
As regards the push strategies, the difference in seniority among workers creates addi-
tional role conflicts for the shop steward. On the one hand, the shop steward is a union 
representative and should help recruit new members to the union (union solidarity). On 
the other hand, the shop steward represents workers and should reflect on what is best 
for them—also when it comes to workers on temporary contracts. Is it fair to make a 
worker join the traditional union, if the worker only has a contract on a few months? 
The worker might after his/her current job find a new job in a completely different sec-
tor, where other traditional unions represent workers during negotiations. Here, the 
shop steward reflects on the interest of those individual workers who move between 
workplaces and take on different temporary jobs (worker solidarity). 
Another pull strategy is to offer all workers an opportunity to give input to the 
next collective bargaining round at the sector level. The local union office and the shop 
steward has informed all workers about the current content of the collective agreement 
and conducted a survey on their wishes to the content of a future collective agreement. 
This inclusion of non-members in the collective bargaining process might help workers 
understand the advantages of having a strong traditional union at the workplace:
‘We asked people what they wanted to include in the collective agreement. The survey was 
given to all workers, and less than half replied. (…) To encourage people to participate it 
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was possible to win a holiday trip. One of the workers who won was not member of our 
union. It was an attempt to provoke the members of the alternative unions and say: “You 
are not a member of our union, and you should not be able to participate, yet, you have 
won”. (…) Many workers complain that the union is invisible on the shop floor. This was 
a way to make ourselves more visible.’ [Shop steward A]
Critique of the local union office
On top of the push and pull strategies mentioned above, which are directed toward the 
alternatively organized workers, the shop steward in company A has found it necessary 
to develop an additional strategy regarding the recruitment and retention of union mem-
bers directed at the union. Many workers have told the shop steward that they have left 
the traditional union due to dissatisfaction with the individual service delivered by the 
local union office. Therefore, the shop steward has developed a strategy of contacting 
the local union office directly and to make them aware of every mistake that they do. 
The aim is to prevent more workers from joining the alternative unions: 
‘The reason why members have shifted to the alternative unions is that our union is too 
expensive and that members have not received a proper service. I am sorry, but I have to 
tell it like it is. (…) It is about guidance and counseling. People can call the union three 
times and get three different answers. That is not OK. I really try to call the union every 
time it happens and tell them: “That is not OK. If you want new members, you have to 
make sure that it works”.’ [Shop steward A]
Case B
Company B is a Danish machine company with approximately 150 production work-
ers. The demand for the company’s products has been on the way up the last couple 
of years and management plans to hire new workers on open-ended contracts. All pro-
duction workers are covered by The Industrial Agreement. After the verdict on closed 
shop agreements in 2006, the first workers joined the alternative unions leaving the 
traditional unions. Today, approximately 15% of the workers are in the alternative 
unions—especially The Union House—and 80% are members of the traditional unions. 
Both young and old, male and female workers, and workers with high and low seniority 
have made the shift. The shop steward representing the production workers has been 
with the company for many years and is a member of the local works council and of 
the board of the local union office. Management and the shop steward have concluded 
several local agreements on pay, working time, and fringe benefits. Local-level wage 
increases are typically negotiated every year. This reflects the wage system in the metal 
industry, where only a minimum wage is negotiated at the sector level.
Strategies toward alternatively organized workers
As in company A, the shop steward in company B makes use of both push and pull strat-
egies toward alternatively organized workers. Local negotiations in Case B seem to offer 
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more opportunities for using both push and pull strategies than in Case A. However, it 
also seems to make the implementation of push strategies even more challenging. The 
following presents a detailed analysis of the different strategies used. 
Push strategies: club members only—but who are the members? 
Shop steward B uses a number of push strategies, which resemble those used by shop 
steward A. One of the push strategies is not to discuss any union matters with work-
ers in the alternative unions and to refuse to answer any questions on union matters. 
However, there is a knowledge gap among the alternatively organized workers. Most of 
them think they are entitled to the same service from the shop steward as members of 
the traditional unions. This has led to confrontations in the local union club, where al-
ternatively organized workers wanted to attend a meeting on local negotiations on pay. 
However, the shop steward did not accept this attempt:
‘We did not exclude them in the first place. They have excluded themselves from the  
negotiations. And then they show at the club meeting. I started the meeting by saying: 
“Welcome to the club meeting. This is a legal club meeting, and I can see that some of the 
people present are not members of the club. Can you tell me, why you are here?”. Then 
a man got up and said that they had the same rights as everybody else to participate in 
meetings on local negotiations on pay. I told him that they did not have the same rights. If 
they did not want to leave, I would close my computer and leave. Then they left. They were 
very angry and complained to management afterwards. (…) They wanted their own shop 
steward, because I did not represent them. But I did not do anything illegal. I just think  
I am being fair to those members, who pay to the traditional unions. They pay more every 
month, and therefore they have certain rights.’ [Shop steward B]
This example shows how local negotiations on pay in fact can lead to an internal conflict 
between organized and alternatively organized workers at the workplace. Such a conflict 
makes the intra-organizational bargaining process more challenging and vulnerable for 
the shop steward. However, it also supplies the shop steward with an opportunity to 
demonstrate a clear difference between organized and alternatively organized workers—
an opportunity that local shop stewards with little bargaining activity do not have. 
Shop steward B underlines that the strategy of “club members only” rests on an 
important precondition. It is not possible to make a sharp distinction between mem-
bers and non-members, unless you are aware of the union affiliation of each individual 
worker. Therefore, the shop steward has worked intensively on creating a map of the 
organizational status of all workers at the company. This push strategy has included call-
ing union offices and interviewing non-members at the workplace, and it is an ongoing 
time-consuming task: 
‘When I was elected as shop steward it was a mess. I did not know who belonged to the 
union or not. My first move was to ask the company about the civil registration numbers 
on all our workers. Then I went to the local union office and asked, who of these workers 
are members. I got a number of lists and I worked my way through them. Some of our 
workers were on none of those lists. Then I went for a walk around the company and 
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asked those workers, which union they belonged to. Some said: “I do not belong to any 
unions”. Others said: “I am a member of The Union House”. And then I wrote that down, 
and I have kept it updated ever since.’ [Shop steward B]
Pull strategies: education and conversion 
According to the shop stewards’ experience, most alternatively organized workers think 
they are entitled to exactly the same shop steward representation as workers in the tra-
ditional unions. The shop steward thinks this is problematic—not only when workers 
have to decide whether or not to join the union but also with regard to the daily work 
of the shop steward, because it can contribute to conflicts between shop stewards and 
alternatively organized workers. After the confrontation at the club meeting, the shop 
steward therefore developed a strategy to teach all workers about the collective agree-
ment and the differences between traditional unions and alternative unions: 
‘After that incident their behavior was completely unacceptable. One of the workers who 
I asked to leave the club meeting had ignored me ever since. I took him into my office and 
asked him: “What is going on?”. He told me. Then I said: “This is what I do, and what  
I pay for. Therefore your behavior was not acceptable.” I explained it to him in detail. 
Then he started to realize, why I did it. I promised him that I would arrange a meeting for 
all workers no matter their union status, and I would explain the collective agreement to 
them. Which benefits workers obtain from the agreement, and what the advantages of union 
membership are. I arranged the meeting and more than 100 workers showed. I showed them 
a power point on how much it costs to join the union per week and how many benefits they 
obtain from that. (…) I did it, because I was fed up. The trouble after the club meeting really 
got to me. Then I thought, if this anger is due to a lack of information, I should give them 
that information. That is why I did it. (…) Lack of information often contributes to that 
workers choose the alternative unions over the traditional ones.’ [Shop steward B]
A later pull strategy has been to convert workers. Here the map of organizational status 
and the networks created when drawing it have been very useful. Now the shop steward 
has an agreement with the local union office that they call if someone wants to shift to the 
alternative union. Then the shop steward can address this worker and have a talk with 
him/her. This agreement with the local union office also helps updating the map which is 
an important job if the strategy of “club members only” should work in the future:
‘If somebody in my company wants to leave our union, the local union calls me, and  
then I usually ask the worker: “I have heard that you have left the union. Why?”  Then he 
gives me an answer. Once I made a worker go back to our union. The union always calls 
me, before they hit the button, so I can talk with the worker. (…) I always tell the workers 
who want to leave: “Think about this and this as well. You might need us.” In one case, 
this made the worker stay.’ [Shop steward B]
Another situation where it has shown possible for the shop steward to convert alterna-
tively organized workers is in relation to individual negotiations. In a recent case, one 
of the line managers advised the shop steward to negotiate an individual solution for 
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an alternatively organized worker—although the shop steward was not obliged to do it. 
The aim was to convince the alternatively organized worker of the concrete benefits of 
being represented by a local shop steward:
‘We had four workers who had a lot of hours on their time accounts. The crisis came and 
we had to do work-sharing, but before we could do that these workers had to take all their 
banked hours as time off in lieu. However, it was not possible to take all this time off. We 
therefore negotiated a special solution for each of them. One of the workers belonged to 
an alternative union, and I said I do not want to help him—only the other three. Then a 
line manager gave me a good advice, and I said: “Okay, I will help all four workers”. I did, 
and afterwards I took the alternatively organized worker aside and said to him: “Do you 
see the difference?”. He said: “Yes, just give me an application form”. Then he joined our 
union. This experience has made me think. I have been very tough when it comes to not 
helping out alternatively organized workers. I think joining the alternative unions is let-
ting all your colleagues down. Here I was saying: “Okay, if can do a good deed and go ask 
them, if they see the difference, they might join the union”.’ [Shop steward B]
Again, local negotiations seem to offer the shop steward in company B additional poten-
tial for recruiting members to the traditional union than the shop steward in company 
A has access to. However, shop steward B agrees with shop steward A that the first 
entrance to the company is the most important possibility of recruiting members to the 
traditional union. It is easier to recruit workers when they recently have been hired: 
‘I have moved a lot of workers from the alternative unions to the traditional unions. I 
think we have moved about 20 workers. (…) But it is always more difficult to convert 
workers, who have been here for some time. When they have made a decision, it is very 
difficult to make them change it. I have succeeded in converting a few, but it is much easier 
to make an impact on newly hired workers.’ [Shop steward B]
Therefore the shop steward and the local managers have agreed on asking all new work-
ers about their union status. Furthermore, the shop steward shows them around and 
informs them about the difference in the services delivered, when joining and when not 
joining the union.
Summary of analysis 
The shop steward in company A and the shop steward in company B have dealt with 
alternatively organized workers in their companies for some time. Shop steward A (who 
rarely negotiates local agreements) makes use of both push and pull strategies toward 
workers in alternative unions. Shop steward B (who often negotiates local agreements) 
also seems to combine both types of strategies. In fact, shop steward A and shop steward 
B tend to use some of the same push strategies and some of the same pull strategies. These 
results suggest that wage setting levels do not determine shop stewards’ overall choice 
of inclusive and exclusive strategies toward alternatively organized workers. Neverthe-
less, our comparison indicates that local negotiations offer more opportunities for mem-
ber recruitment—as well as impose larger challenges on shop stewards. It is possible to 
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identify two different forms of push strategies and two different forms of pull strategies 
across the two cases studied. 
Push strategies compared
Both shop stewards used different forms of push strategies toward alternatively orga-
nized workers. Push strategies are considered fair to those workers who pay the higher 
fee to the traditional unions, and are used to retain existing union members. One of 
these strategies relates to situations where shop stewards take on the role of a policeman 
(see Table 3 for an overview of push/pull strategies and shop steward roles). Here, shop 
stewards correct behavior by the individual alternatively organized worker that exceeds 
Table 3 Push and pull strategies toward alternatively organized workers identified in the case analyses.
Push strategies Pull strategies
Policeman Researcher Missionary Teacher
Case A Do not answer  
difficult questions from 
alternatively organized 
workers
Do not assist  
alternatively organized 
workers when fired
Do not invite  
alternatively organized 
workers to debate 
sessions
Convince new work-
ers on open-ended 
contracts about the 
advantages of the 
traditional union
Inform all workers 
about the collective 
agreement
Ask all workers  
about input to  
collective bargaining
Case B Do not answer ques-
tions from alternatively 
organized workers
Do not discuss union-
related issues with 
alternatively organized 
workers
Throw alternatively 
organized workers out 
of local club meetings 
on negotiations 
Keep record of the 
exact union status 
and unemployment 
insurance status of all 
workers (calling union 
offices; asking workers 
on the shop floor)
Help new workers 
and convince them 
of the advantages of 
joining the traditional 
union
Ask organized work-
ers who want to join 
the alternative unions 
why—and convince 
them to stay 
Negotiate individual 
solutions for alterna-
tively organized work-
ers and recommend 
union membership 
afterward
Inform all workers 
about the collective 
agreement 
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what they are entitled to as non-members. Shop stewards refuse to answer questions 
and/or discuss union-related issues (Case A and B), they do not invite non-members 
to debate sessions (Case A), or they throw alternatively organized workers out of club 
meetings on negotiations of pay (Case B). The last action is only an option for shop 
steward B, as shop steward A rarely negotiates. However, policing is difficult and might 
not be respected, unless it rests on correct information. Therefore, one of the shop stew-
ards has also taken on the role as a researcher and spends a lot of time on creating and 
updating an exact map of the union status of all workers at the workplace (Case B). 
Pull strategies compared
Both shop stewards underline that pull strategies are more successful than push strate-
gies when it comes to attracting new union members. The pull strategies used in the 
cases studied fall in two groups. The most effective strategy when it comes to member 
recruitment seems to be when shop stewards act as a missionary and show workers 
the benefits of shop steward representation in practice. Their actions must have an in-
dividual and concrete character to demonstrate the personal advantages of member-
ship for the worker in question. To the shop stewards’ experience, the easiest way to 
convince workers of the advantages of joining the traditional union is to convert them 
when they have just been hired (Case A and B). Therefore, the first talk between worker 
and shop steward and the initial help offered is crucial. One of the shop stewards has 
also succeeded in converting workers who have been with the company for many years. 
This was among others done by negotiating an individual solution for an alternatively 
organized worker and asking him to join the traditional union afterward (Case B). Here, 
local negotiations supply shop steward B with larger opportunities for recruitment than 
shop steward A has access to. 
Another important pull strategy is when shop stewards take on the role as a teacher. 
According to the shop stewards, workers do not know the content of the collective 
agreement that covers their workplace and they know little about union activities and 
union influence. Both shop stewards have worked on raising the level of information 
by distributing written material (Case A) or by presenting the content of the collective 
agreement at a big meeting for all workers (Case B). One of them has even asked all 
workers, including the alternatively organized workers, for input to upcoming negotia-
tions in a survey (Case A). The teacher does not seem to be as effective as the missionary 
when it comes to recruiting new members. However, this strategy has another important 
function. Shop steward B uses teaching as a way of restoring the relationship with the 
alternatively organized workers after the policeman has been in action. Policing can cre-
ate internal conflicts on the employee side, which potentially makes it more difficult for 
the shop steward to collect support from the employees. This is a serious risk for a shop 
steward like shop steward B who often negotiates. 
Conclusion 
Surveys have indicated that Danish shop stewards split in two groups when it comes 
to alternatively organized and unorganized workers—half of the shop stewards choose 
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to represent them (pull strategy) and half of them choose not to represent them (push 
strategy). However, our two explorative case studies of shop stewards’ strategies toward 
alternatively organized workers suggest that the two strategies are not exclusive, but are 
used simultaneously for different purposes. 
The analysis indicates that shop stewards use push strategies in order to retain cur-
rent members of the traditional unions. Pull strategies seem to be used as a recruitment 
instrument. However, pull strategies can also be used to cope with unwanted side effects 
of push strategies. This was especially clear in the case where the shop steward often ne-
gotiated collective agreements (Case B). Here, push strategies contributed to the creation 
of internal conflicts on the employee side that had to be solved, before they became a 
threat to the shop stewards’ local bargaining mandate. The example indicates that pull 
strategies have important functions, when local shop stewards combine recruitment ac-
tivities with intra-organizational bargaining activities. 
Two different push strategies (policeman and researcher) and two different pull 
strategies (missionary and teacher) are to varying degrees used in the case companies. 
Some of the strategies seem to be directed toward the total worker collective (researcher, 
teacher), whereas others are targeted toward individual workers (policeman, mission-
ary). Our studies suggest that local negotiations may enhance the opportunities for shop 
stewards’ use of individual and more “activist-oriented” strategies (Chang 2005). Bar-
gaining activities create additional possibilities to demonstrate the benefits of local-level 
representation in practice by including (missionary) or excluding (policeman) individual 
workers. However, results indicate that recruitment strategies with a collective character 
in general might be easier to implement than individual and activist-oriented strategies. 
The latter seem to impose larger challenges on the shop steward. This is not only true for 
shop stewards with intensive bargaining activities that depend on a strong local bargain-
ing mandate. Other factors might interplay with the take-up of push and pull strategies 
that are targeted toward individual workers. 
Worker seniority: temporary workers and older colleagues
Certain groups of employees seem to impose additional role conflicts on local shop stew-
ards that seek to recruit and retain union members. Company A mostly hires new workers 
on temporary contracts. This makes the shop steward hesitate to do missionary work 
toward newly hired workers. Many of these workers will stay in the peripheral group of 
workers at the company, before they move on to another job, and the shop steward does 
not think it is fair to convince such workers to join the traditional union, which it oriented 
to a certain line of business (Atkinson 1987; Marsden 2004). In other words, short con-
tracts create a role conflict for the shop steward between representing the interest of such 
workers (who might find a new job in a completely different industry) and representing 
the interest of the union. This imposes a dilemma between worker solidarity (solidarity 
with temporary workers) and union solidarity (solidarity with the union). 
At the same time many workers at company A have a very high seniority 
(20–30 years), and this raises other concerns for the shop steward. A significant group 
of these workers has moved from the traditional union to an alternative union, but 
some of them are old colleagues that has helped the shop steward for many years at 
the assembly line and vice versa. The shop steward feels it is difficult to stop helping 
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these workers with union-related issues, i.e., to act as a policeman. When it comes to 
the question of union status, shop stewards are expected to show union solidarity. 
However, they still have to deal with a workplace solidarity among their colleagues, 
which might transcend their union status, because everybody depends on this solidar-
ity in the daily working life. In sum both workplace solidarity with old colleagues 
and worker solidarity with new workers on temporary contracts question the shop 
stewards solidarity with the traditional union in company A. 
Local union offices: shop steward support and member service 
In Case B, the local union office supplies the shop steward with help and support, which 
improve opportunities for recruitment and retention of union members. This coopera-
tion with the local union office makes it easier for the shop steward to target individual 
and activist-oriented strategies like the policeman or the missionary toward the alterna-
tively organized workers. However, the local union office seems to act quite differently 
in Case A. Here, the shop steward often finds it difficult to get the support needed from 
the local union. Furthermore, and more importantly, workers in the traditional union 
do not seem to receive the help they are entitled to from the local union office. As men-
tioned earlier, workers are covered by the collective agreement no matter their union 
status, and therefore workers mainly compare the quality of individual services offered 
by the traditional union and the quality of the individual services offered by the alterna-
tive union (see Table 1). In this case, the better performance by the alternative unions on 
the individual services makes it difficult for the shop steward to use pull strategies and 
recruit new members to the more expensive traditional union. The poor performance of 
the traditional union is especially challenging for the shop steward, because wage setting 
takes place at the sector level. The shop steward does not negotiate any local agreements 
and therefore cannot use this additional instrument to demonstrate a difference between 
the traditional and the alternative unions.
Discussion: Shop stewards as organizers—a hidden potential?
Traditional unions in the Western world find it increasingly difficult to recruit and re-
tain members. This is also the case in Denmark, where membership rates are declining 
among traditional unions that participate in collective bargaining and social dialogue. 
Furthermore, alternative unions that offer individual juridical guidance and assistance 
at a cheaper price are growing. This increases the competition between unions. Collec-
tive agreements cover all employees at workplaces, where they are present. Accordingly, 
it is possible for workers to free ride on agreement coverage and to buy the individual 
service cheaper at the alternative unions instead. However, our analysis points at some 
of the limitations to free riding. It is not possible to free ride on the representation by 
the local shop steward. If a shop steward is present, it might therefore be a more ratio-
nal choice for the individual worker to stay in the traditional union, because it entitles 
him/her to shop steward assistance in individual negotiations, disagreements with man-
agement, or in case of being fired. The analysis indicates that shop stewards hold the 
potential of organizing due to the fact that they can demonstrate a visible difference in 
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services between members of the traditional union and non-members. Comparing a case 
of local-level and sector-level bargaining, this seems especially true for shop stewards 
who often negotiate at the workplace. However, shop stewards are vulnerable organiz-
ers as they depend on the support they receive from other workers. They also depend on 
support from the local union office as organizing is a time-consuming task. It also seems 
to weaken the shop stewards possibility to organize if the individual member service 
delivered by the local union office is dissatisfactory. In the latter case it might in fact be 
a more rational choice for workers to join an alternative union. In sum, our case study 
analysis suggests that shop stewards’ choice of recruitment and retention strategies is a 
very reflective choice that considers potential role conflicts between worker, workplace, 
and union solidarity in each situation. This is why each shop steward makes use of more 
than one strategy. Further empirical studies are needed to examine the quantitative dis-
tribution of the push and pull strategies identified in the case studies and their effects. 
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End notes
1  Danish unions and unemployment insurance funds are separate organizations. However, 
each union has historically been administering their own unemployment insurance fund. This 
means that the Danish labor market in practice can be characterized as a Ghent system, where 
unions and unemployment insurances are combined (Due et al. 2010; Visser 2006). For many 
years this strong relation between union activities and unemployment insurance has contrib-
uted to the recruitment of union members. 
2  Membership figures reported by the organizations themselves. Source: www.krifa.dk; www.
detfagligehus.dk.
3  The Industrial Agreement is concluded by The Central Organization of Industrial Employees 
in Denmark (CO-industri) and The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI).
4  The Collective Agreement for the Food Industry is negotiated between The Danish Food and 
Allied Workers’ Union (NNF) and The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI).
